Sophia

Sophia is a publication that provides a forum for philosophical thought for undergraduate students from the University of Victoria as well as other University or College students. Though the content is primarily intended for philosophy students, it is open to all disciplines premised on the hope of stimulating philosophical thought and dialogue in all academic communities.

We welcome constructive commentary and criticism concerning both quality and theme of any of the works published. For work that students may want to have published in next year’s volume of Sophia, please see the back cover.

Martin Seale

The Sophia is a team effort. The Philosophy Students’ Union organizes numerous fundraising events throughout the school year. Special thanks are extended to numerous faculty members for their gracious support.

This journal is available online at web.uvic.ca/philosophy

Copyright of the papers in this journal remains the property of the authors.

Adjacent Image:

Frontispiece from Francis Bacon’s "The Advancement of Learning"

Volume 7

2004

Contents

Ascent and Unity: The Augustinian Account of Time and Eternity

Mark Shumelda, University of Toronto 1

Truth and Probability

Sam Cowling, University of Victoria 11

The Failure of the Likelihood Principle in the Creationism/ Darwinism Debate

Rhys McKinnon, University of Victoria 31

Matter, Mutation, and Morals: A Naturalist Account of Free Will

Anthony Kulic, University of Victoria 41

Wishful Thinking: A Critique of Alan Turing’s Imitation Game

Joel Buenting, University Of Victoria 57

The Logic of Ambiguity: Reappraising Roland Barthes’ Theory of Professional Wrestling.

Owen Ware, University of Victoria 67

Ascent and Unity

Mark Shumelda

Abstract

Augustine views temporal existence as a particularly negative and troubling experience: "I am scattered in times whose order I do not understand. The storms of incoherent events tear to pieces my thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul." Time is an obstacle between us and our union with the One, or God. Augustine’s understanding of temporal experience underpins his entire Neoplatonic and Christian metaphysical framework. In Augustine’s philosophy, the natural end for human beings is to obtain union with the divine. However, because of our sinful state, we lead fragmented and scattered lives. Only by struggling to unify all aspects of our person can we hope to achieve communion with the Creator. Indeed, for Augustine, "temporal successiveness is an experience of disintegration; the ascent to divine eternity is a recovery of unity."

For Augustine, time is a distraction which prevents temporal beings from experiencing the fullness of reality. Time is simply that which makes us see reality as transitory rather than unchanging. Early on in Book XI of the Confessions, Augustine concludes that neither past nor future times exist. He asks, "Who can measure the past which does not now exist or the future which does not yet exist, unless perhaps someone dares to assert that he can measure what has no existence?" Only the present moment exists, and yet "the cause of its being is that it will cease to be." In conclusion, "we cannot truly say that time exists except in the sense that it tends towards non-existence." Augustine does not offer an explanation for why the present moment always tends towards non-existence, but he does maintain that anything that exists at all does so by virtue of the present moment. Although past and future times do not exist, past and future events do. In particular, "the present considering the past is the memory, the present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present considering the future is expectation." Thus, a temporal being can only experience past and future events using the mind. Yet since the mind is clearly fallible — memory fails us and our predictions may not turn out to be true — it provides only an imperfect way of experiencing reality. Augustine contrasts this temporal experience with the experience of eternity, in which "nothing is transient, but the whole is present."

Augustine ultimately concludes that the sequential nature of time fragments a temporal being. The successiveness of events distends or stretches us apart psychologically, mentally, and spiritually. At one point, Augustine exclaims: "See how my life is a distension in several directions." The present moment "flies so quickly from future into past" that a temporal being can only experience reality in a succession of durationless intervals. Even the feeling of wholeness which comes about with some "complete" experience — such as hearing a song from start to finish — is actually fragmented and disjointed. "What occurs in the [reading of the] psalm as a whole occurs in its particular pieces and its individual syllables. The same is true…of the entire life of an individual person, where all actions are parts of a whole, and of the total history of ‘the sons of men’ (Ps. 30:20) where all human lives are but parts." A temporal being is never able to experience anything more than discrete slices of reality. As the human mind concentrates on different events, it undergoes stretching and fragmentation. It is this notion that leads Augustine to describe time as a "painful and anxious experience."

In stark contrast to the painful and fragmented imagery which Augustine associates with time stands the "sublime" and "splendid" picture of eternity. Simply put, eternity lies outside of time altogether. The experience of eternity is characterized by words such as simultaneity, constancy, and wholeness. For an eternal being, nothing is "uttered in a succession with a conclusion, but everything is said in the simultaneity of eternity." Eternity is constant and "always in the present." As Augustine claims, "Eternity, in which there is neither future nor past, stands still and dictates future and past times." This imagery corresponds with the Neoplatonic and Christian ideas of emanation, creation, and sustenance. Finally, an eternal being can experience reality with a sense of wholeness which is beyond the capabilities of a merely temporal being. Even a temporal being who knew all there was to know about every future and past event would lack the unity experienced by a being who apprehended all of reality simultaneously: "If there were a mind endowed with such great knowledge and prescience that all things past and future could be known in the way I know a very familiar psalm, this mind would be utterly miraculous and amazing to the point of inducing awe." Nothing of the past or the future would be "hidden" from this mind.

Indeed, eternity is a single, unchanging present moment in which all of reality is simultaneously apprehended.

Augustine offers several clues as to how a temporal being might change in order to experience eternity. The key to this change of experience lies in the idea of self-unification. Scattered as we are by various events — past, present and future — which vie for our attention, we find it difficult to harmonize our thoughts, actions and desires. Nevertheless, Augustine seems to indicate that this kind of "fixity" or "stillness" is a necessary condition for experiencing eternity: "Who can lay hold on the heart and give it fixity, so that for some little moment it may be stable, and for a fraction of time may grasp the splendour of a constant eternity?" Of course, it may not be humanly possible to achieve the kind of harmony and orderliness which Augustine suggests is necessary for experiencing an unchanging and ever present existence. Furthermore, fixity and harmony may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for changing one’s temporal experience into an eternal one. In any event, for a temporal being to experience eternity, it must somehow reach toward God — the being who is ultimately unified.

Augustine suggests that in returning to the source of our existence, we may achieve the constancy necessary for experiencing eternity. Since God is ultimately unified, we can use him as a reference point for our own efforts at self-unification. He explains that the "reliable truth" which leads us to the source of all things can be taught by "some mutable creature." The "reliable truth" is, of course, the Christian Gospel. Augustine means to say that it is within our power to start our journey towards experiencing eternity. In order for our experience of reality to be changed, we must

Human beings, as temporal creatures, require a mediator between themselves and God in order to be able to experience eternity. Experiencing eternity does indeed require us to struggle with the scatteredness and fragmentation which besets our temporal existence. According to Augustine, our efforts ought to focus on Jesus, the

The mediator unifies our being in preparation for the experience of eternity. As Augustine indicates in the following passage, it is God who ultimately liberates us from the scattering and fragmentation of temporal experience: "The storms of incoherent events tear to pieces my thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul, until that day when, purified and molten by the fire of your life, I flow together to merge into you."

Finally, it seems appropriate to highlight a possible connection between the fleeting present moment which "tends towards non-existence" and the constant present of eternity (which, for clarity, I will hereafter refer to as the Present). Although they may at first seem entirely opposite in nature, it is worth underscoring the tremendous existential and ontological importance that Augustine applies to both. For a temporal being, only the present moment is real. Similarly for an eternal being, the Present is all that exists. Augustine refers to both as dimensionless. He also explains that "if the present were always present, it would not pass into the past: it would not be time but eternity." Perhaps all of this suggests that the key to experiencing the Present lies, in some sense, in the present. "The storms of incoherent events" of the past and future indeed scatter and distract us, so that only by concentrating on our awareness of the present can we begin to unify our being.

Work Cited:

Augustine. Confessions. Trans. and ed. Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Truth and Probability

Sam Cowling

Abstract

Counterfactuals, negations, vague statements, and several other classes of propositions have proven to be formidable challenges to correspondence theorists. For those that have rejected the correspondence thesis, several alternative theories of truth have been developed (i.e. deflationary, pragmatic, super-justificationary). Among these alternatives, the coherence theory of truth has gained considerable popularity. The coherence theory rejects the existence of objective truth-conditions for propositions. Instead, it proposes that propositions are made true or false by the extent to which they cohere with an individual or society's set of beliefs. This criterion of truth is expressed in the thesis that "x is true if and only if x coheres with a set of beliefs".

In this paper, I will draw into consideration another kind of proposition that cannot be accommodated by the correspondence theory of truth. The kind of proposition I am referring to involves the assertion or specification of probability values (i.e. "There is a 12% of rain tomorrow.", "There are even odds for coin toss x.", "The DNA test is 99.9% accurate."); I will refer to these propositions as p-statements. I maintain that the correspondence theory of truth cannot account for the truth for p-statements because no subjective or objective account of probability articulates satisfactory truth-conditions for p-statements. I will argue that a coherence theory of truth has considerable philosophical and scientific utility when applied to p-statements; therefore, a coherence criterion of truth should be used to assess the truth-value of p-statements.

This essay is not an argument for a global coherentist position. It seems reasonable that truth will be a chimerical entity when it concerns such radically different propositions as probability values, mathematical objects, meta-ethical entities, subjective states, existential claims, and whatever else we can meaningfully speak of. As a result, this essay makes a case only for the adoption of a coherentist criterion of truth in regards to propositions about probability.

My argument for this thesis is divisible into three premises: (i) No objective theory of probability is satisfactory; (ii) No subjective theory of probability will provide correspondence theory adequate truth-conditions for p-statements, (iii) A subjective theory of probability and a coherence theory of truth are the remaining options and are both compatible and useful when appropriately articulated. To establish premise (i) I will discuss two contemporary accounts of probability that could potentially provide objective truth-conditions for p-statements. These accounts are the Relative Frequency theory and the Propensity theory. I will argue the Relative Frequency theory fails outright and is also reducible to Subjectivism. I will then offer an argument against the objective nature of probability that is a defining feature of the Propensity theory. After rejecting the possibility of an objective theory of probability, I will consider a Subjectivist theory of probability and then demonstrate the truth of premise (ii). I will then offer two arguments for the impossibility of a satisfactory Subjectivist theory of probability when considered under a correspondence theory of truth. Following this proposal, I will outline premise (iii) and the benefits of adopting a coherentist-subjectivist notion of probability.

Before I offer my argument for the coherence criterion of truth to be applied to p-statements, it will be useful to consider the metaphysical ‘queerness’ of probability. If we assume a basic metaphysical realist position, we can imagine that a totality of facts is what constitutes reality. Given this totality of facts, where can we locate the facts about probability that will make p-statements true or false? The difficulty in locating these facts is the impetus behind my thesis. If there are no adequate objective facts to serve as truth-conditions, then the correspondence theory of truth will be unable to determine which statements about probability are true and which are false. Consequently, if the correspondence theory fails, then the adoption of a coherentist position about the truth of p-statements is a viable course of action.

The most obvious problem with the frequency theory is that it seems incapable of determining the probability for novel or ‘one-shot’ probabilistic situations. The novel or one-shot nature of these situations is due to the absence of a clearly comparative reference class (i.e. the probability of an egg falling off a monkey’s head while balancing on the hood of a car and smoking a cigarette has no clear comparative reference class). Because there can be no satisfactorily comparative reference class for these situations, there can be no adequate probability values offered.

A second problem results in considering infinite series of situations. Simple mathematics dictates that no number can be divided by infinity and, as a result, frequency cannot be calculated in an infinite series; therefore, if coin tosses are an infinite series, we cannot determine the total probability value of coin tosses. Moreover, it seems that a limited finite series could provide a frequency that misrepresents the probability of an event (e.g. ‘if three events constitute a reference class and outcome x occurs in all three events, then the probability of x occurring in event four is 100%’). This cluster of conceptual problems that emerge in the Relative Frequency theory indicate that there is deep problem with its central thesis.

Attempts to solve this problem of generating probability values within an infinite series have relied on the notion of mathematical limits that approach a statistical equilibrium. The problem that emerges from these attempts is that the higher order mathematics required leads to the possibility of getting irrational numbers as the probability value. If this is the case and we subscribe to the additivity of probability values, then the problems within the mathematics of probability lead to a contradiction. Moreover, the general adequacy of accepting statistical equilibrium as a probability value has been subject to much scepticism.

Attempts at determining how to calculate probability values for one-shot or skewed finite series have relied on the proposal of ‘hypothetical’ or ‘ideal’ reference classes. These two proposals are, however, destined for either failure or reduction into subjectivity about probability.

To determine the probability for a one-shot event or to formulate a non-skewed finite series, hypothetical reference classes have to be postulated. This postulation would rely on abstracting factors causally relevant to a situation’s outcome and proposing that these factors would result in a certain frequency of outcomes (e.g. the causal relevance of surface area to a coin toss directly impacts statistical outcomes such that a frequency of .5 heads and .5 tails occurs). The problem with this method is that the surface area of a coin must be assessed as a relevant factor, while other less relevant factors (e.g. humidity, astrological alignment, time of day) must be excluded. Since calculating on the basis of an infinite number of factors is profoundly impractical, a finite number of factors are isolated and then used to project the frequency of outcomes in the hypothetical reference class. The determination of the relevant factors is, however, an undertaking that must be grounded in subjective beliefs about causality. Moreover, any reference class, with any possible frequency, could be formulated based on the infinite number of possible factor combinations. Because these references classes could lead to any conceivable frequency they could serve as the truth-conditions for any p-statement; therefore, specification of an event’s relevant factors is required to provide adequate truth conditions and to avoid postulating reference classes based on seemingly irrelevant factors. Consequently, the hypothetical reference class theory requires a subjective assessment of relevant factors in order to produce adequate truth-conditions for p-statements. If this is the case, then the relative frequency theory fails without subjective beliefs or is simply reducible to subjective beliefs about outcomes and what factors are causally relevant.

The ‘ideal’ reference class theory is similarly troubled. To determine the ‘ideal’ frequency of an outcome, without it actually occurring, is to beg the question. Talking about ‘ideal’ frequency is ultimately presupposing that the ‘ideal’ probability of an event is something other than the observed frequency and to posit this is to commit to a subjective theory of probability. I am here arguing for the fundamental point that relative frequency, if it is to be useful, requires the existence of theoretical reference classes; however, these classes are dependent upon subjective considerations of causal relevance and expected frequencies. This dependency indicates that Relative Frequency theory cannot stand alone as a theory of probability and that it is, in some sense, reducible to subjectivism.

Despite its failure to provide objective truth-conditions, the Relative Frequency theory of probability is vital to science and statistics because of it is ability to accommodate theorems and axioms used in empirical investigation. For this reason, it seems that the empirical applicability of the theory is considerable even though the nature of probability is not identical to frequency in a reference class.

At this point, in lieu of outlining the details of Popper’s particular account of the Propensity theory of probability, I will offer my argument against all theories that maintain an objective account of probability. The crucial problem with the objectivity of Popper’s account and its resulting realism about probability is best illustrated through the following example:

(b) If we assert that your statement is true and the alien scientist’s statement is false, we have forfeited any ability to investigate situations to acquire greater certainty about the likelihood of outcomes and have lapsed into a clearly inadequate notion of probability. If this is the case, then probability cannot be influenced by anything apart from the number of possible outcomes (i.e. two possible outcomes yields fifty-fifty odds in all possible cases). This is a clearly inadequate theory, when we consider that it would assert that when tossing a pair of dice there are equal odds of each possible outcome occurring even if we know the dice to be loaded towards one particular outcome.

(c) If both statements are false, then we have effectively surrendered any possibility of probability values being true or false in a useful fashion. This might be amenable to a strict correspondence theorist who would then ascribe no truth-conditions to p-statements and, as a result, avoid many problems. It would also confirm my thesis that the correspondence theory is incapable of accommodating p-statements.

(d) If both statements are true, then we are faced with a deep problem. How can you say that there is both a fifty percent chance of heads and a seventy-five percent chance of heads without committing to an obvious contradiction? A theory of probability must be formulated that allows for subjectively true p-statements indexed to the extent of an individual’s knowledge of a situation. It would then be true that there is a seventy-five percent chance of heads occurring for the alien scientist and also true that there is a fifty percent chance of heads occurring for you, but only one p-statement can be true for a given individual.

For this reason, it appears that the propensity theory, as a realist position concerning probability, is committed to failure. Reflecting on the nature of probability within reality can also draw out this failure. When Wittgenstein states that "there is no object peculiar to probability propositions", he offers a simple, but vital insight: probability is not simply a set of facts stitched into the fabric of the universe. As a result of the problems with Popper’s position and this insight offered by Wittgenstein, we can conclude that objective theories of probability are fundamentally flawed.

If this is the case, then where can we locate the subjective truth-makers of p-statements and attempt to save the correspondence theory? The only possible answer remaining is that beliefs are the truth-conditions of p-statements; however, in the following section, I will argue that beliefs cannot function as adequate truth-conditions of p-statements.

It construes talk about probability as talk about our beliefs and expectations regarding a future we are otherwise ignorant of. A construal that is favourable when we consider the way we utilise p-statements in language does not seem indicate any referent beyond our beliefs, certainly not relative reference classes or propensities. Moreover, if p-statements have been viable linguistic tools prior to the articulation of these concepts, then the proposal that these objects are the true referents of p-statements seems to distort the linguistic character of probability. This account of probability does, however, fail under the correspondence theory of truth for two reasons.

As earlier stated, the primary thesis of a correspondence theory of truth is that a proposition is made true by its relation to objective facts or states of affairs. This relation is incompatible with the relation of our subjective beliefs to p-statements. There is simply no way in which a belief about the likelihood of an outcome can be differentiated sufficiently to offer true quantitative (i.e. numerical) p-statements. How could an individual possibly determine whether he or she believes an event will occur to an extent of seventy-six percent or whether he or she believes it to a degree of seventy-five percent? No amount of introspection can ascribe definite values to the phenomenal state that we construe as identical to a belief.

Ramsey attempted to solve this problem by supposing that beliefs could be cashed out in the behaviour of betting. An individual’s extent of belief about the probability of an outcome could be determined by the actions he or she would undertake in a betting situation. The value of epistemic belief could then be assessed through hypothetical scenarios in which individuals would bet on a potential outcome; however, Ramsey’s ingenuity falls short of being a solution to correspondence theorists’ problems.

Not only is a betting situation a concept loaded with considerations of motive, inclination, and other subjective values that could distort the numerical value of an individual’s degree of belief; it is also simply not identical with the subjective extent of belief. If a correspondence theorist were to accept Ramsey’s theory, he or she would have to maintain that hypothetical betting behaviour is the fact that makes propositions true or accept a fundamental scepticism about exact probability values due to the ambiguities of betting behaviour. Neither of these options appears to satisfy the requirements of a sound correspondence theory account of p-statements.

The second problem that emerges from this account of probability is that it seems to sanction individuals’ possession of any degree of belief about the likelihood of an outcome. If the fact that makes p-statements true is simply the extent of belief, then it appears any p-statement could be true so long as it is believed by an individual. This is a deep criticism and a well-founded one. Under simple correspondence, p-statements will be true if and only if the extent of an individual’s belief corresponds to the probability value specified in a p-statement. As fundamental as subjective belief is to probability, the possibility of someone being incorrect about chance is intuitively real. Ramsey attempted to overcome this problem by positing that true probability beliefs require a rational individual, defined by Ramsey as an agent that would not commit to a Dutch book. This analysis is again flawed by its reliance on the epistemic ambiguities of betting situations.

These two reasons provide evidence that the correspondence theory of truth and the subjective theory of probability are incompatible. We have, however, seen that subjective probability is, if not the only tenable theory of probability, the theory that the Relative Frequency is necessarily reducible to. In order to salvage the crucial insights Subjectivism provides, a shift is required in considering what makes p-statements true. It seems that because probability has no facts to properly correspond to, the truth-value of p-statements must determined via a different criterion; a criterion that is epistemic in character. A useful and intuitively satisfactory position is that p-statements are made true by their coherence with a set of beliefs.

To adopt a coherentist account of the truth of p-statements requires a reasonably sophisticated formulation of what context coherence occurs in. A primitive coherentist position that maintains statements are made true by coherence with any individual’s belief set, will simply lead back to the problem of explaining how any individual can make false p-statements. Instead, a coherentist position based on the maximally-compatible beliefs of a community can provide a viable and relatively simple account of truth. To this end, I maintain that a probability statement is true within a community if it coheres with the beliefs of that community. Community, in this sense, is vaguely defined, but adaptable dependent upon theoretical demands. It could be argued that this position leads to the inability of uttering a false p-statement possible if more than a single individual assents to it. This is a criticism easily resolved by stating that if the requisite intellectual, linguistic, or social separation is present, then a separate community is formed with potentially different, but nonetheless true p-statements.

The utility of this account also emerges from the possibility of a pluralist system for falsifying p-statements. For a community which accepts and inductive logic formulation of probability it may prove impossible to falsify a p-statement under this system; however, if we adopt a coherentist position that accommodates a variety of maximally coherent methodologies, a statement could be proven false by its failure to cohere with a certain belief in a given belief set beyond the scope of the inductive logical system. We can assume that such a belief set would include (at least within our given community) commitments to the additivity of probability.

The challenge for this formulation of probability is to account for the subjective differences in estimates of probability as seen in 2.3. How can the beliefs of a community account for two individuals within that community maintaining two different p-statements both of which are true? These individuals do not in any way comprise communities unto themselves, so what can make their statements simultaneously true for each, but not for both? The belief in empirical evidence informing the valuation of probabilities held by a community can do exactly this. Each individual in the 2.3 scenario has access to different empirical evidence, so a community’s acceptance of certain beliefs regarding how to apply the knowledge gained through empirical investigation to beliefs about probability values can account for varying true p-statements.